**Neg---Subs**

**Taiwan**

**1NC – stuff**

**China thinks they have Taiwan in a “forced mate.”**

**Fish 14** [Isaac Stone Fish is a senior fellow at the Asia Society’s Center on U.S-China Relations. He was formerly the Asia editor at Foreign Policy Magazine, 2-12-14, "An Offer They Can't Refuse," Foreign Policy, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/12/an-offer-they-cant-refuse/>] Eric

In the game of chess, there’s a concept called "**forced mate**." The term refers to one side maneuvering its pieces to guarantee victory in a set number of moves, regardless of what the opponent does. On Feb. 11, representatives of the Chinese and Taiwanese government met in the mainland Chinese city of Nanjing. Expected to produce few, if any breakthroughs, the symbolism of the event is still great: It is their [first formal meeting](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/world/asia/china-and-taiwan-hold-first-official-talks-since-civil-war.html) in 65 years. Since the Nationalists fled to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949, Beijing has viewed the island as a renegade province and has made its "reunification with the motherland" a paramount objective. Tensions have occasionally flared: As recently as the 1990s, China [lobbed](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Taiwan_Strait_Crisis) missiles into the strait between the mainland and Taiwan, Taiwanese politicians threatened to declare independence, and the United States moved two aircraft carrier groups into the region. Today, however, the link between mainland China and the self-governing entity of 23 million people just 110 miles off its eastern coast is warmer than it’s ever been, even as Taiwan continues to insist on its rights as a self-governing body. So if China makes the right moves, and continues to successfully and peacefully draw Taiwan into its orbit, can it create a "forced mate" situation? Beijing has been making Taipei an offer it can’t refuse: a readily accessible market of **1.3 billion people**. In arguably its greatest foreign policy success over the last decade, Beijing has been taking a patient and long-term approach toward the island, offering sweetheart economic deals and a reduction of military rhetoric (though China still maintains an estimated 1,600 missiles [aimed](http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/10/09/2003574061) across the strait) while isolating Taiwan internationally. The 2008 election in Taiwan of Ma Ying-jeou, the head of the Kuomintang Party, helped: Ma’s party favors closer ties with China, unlike the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which ran Taiwan for the previous eight years. After Ma took power, Beijing visibly softened toward Taiwan, authorizing a series of economic deals that were favorable to the island, like the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which reduced tariffs. "We can give up our profits because Taiwanese compatriots are our brothers," [said](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10442557) then-Premier Wen Jiabao. In June 2008, the two sides [agreed](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/04/business/worldbusiness/04iht-04fly.14224270.html) to begin direct tourist flights, and, in December of that year, they [started](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/news/15iht-15TAIWAN.18675854.html) direct shipping traffic and mail service. Some 2.85 million Chinese nationals [visited](http://news.yahoo.com/record-2-85-million-chinese-visited-taiwan-2013-171651510.html) Taiwan in 2013, up 10 percent from the year before (more than [double](http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2014/01/05/397603/Taiwan-sees.htm) the number coming from Japan, the second-largest source of visitors). And in 2013, bilateral trade [reached](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-28/taiwan-china-government-officials-to-meet-feb-11-for-first-time.html) $197.2 billion, up nearly 100 percent from when Ma was elected. Bloomberg, citing government statistics, reported that, today, roughly 40 percent of Taiwan’s exports head to China. Many analysts now see this as the endgame. "Cross-strait interdependence has been an **irreversible process**, at least in **economic**, **social** and **cultural terms**," notes Titus C. Chen, an associate research fellow at the National Chengchi University in Taipei. He adds, "The prospects of Taiwan can no longer be separated from those of China." When asked about the chess analogy, June Teufel Dreyer, an expert on China’s international relations at the University of Miami, offered a different one instead. "There’s a type of insect that a horde of ants will attack. The ants lay their eggs in the insect, and then eat it," Dreyer says. "That’s what happening with Taiwan." While Taiwan has become closer to China, it has also grown **more isolated** from the rest of the world. Only 21 nations [recognize](http://www.dw.de/taiwans-diplomatic-charm-offensive/a-17380254) Taiwan, the largest of which is the poor African nation of Burkina Faso, which has a population of 15 million. The Holy See recognizes Taiwan, but it’s the only European state to do so. (Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and [participates](http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm) in the World Health Organization as a "separate customs territory.") Taiwan strives, and mostly fails, to attend international summits. In September 2013, I received an e-mail from the U.S. Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office, Taiwan’s embassy-like presence in Washington, crowing that Taiwan "has been invited to attend the 38th session of the International Civil Aviation Organization Assembly for the first time since losing its ICAO seat in 1971." Washington, Taiwan’s most important ally, has long said it recognizes that there is only one China, and that it hopes Beijing and Taipei can peacefully resolve their differences. "The administration is very supportive of improved cross-strait relations," says a senior U.S. defense official, who asked to speak on background. The United States has [sold](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30957.pdf) tens of billions of dollars of arms to Taiwan over the last few decades, though the number has dropped recently. "The United States makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability," says Jeff Pool, a Pentagon spokesman. U.S. policy toward Taiwan is often described as "**strategic ambiguity**" — not stating if America will or will not defend Taiwan if China seizes it by force. There is great strategic and symbolic value to the United States maintaining its alliance with Taiwan. But the status of Taiwan matters far less to Washington, and to Americans, than it does to Beijing and the Chinese. "There’s the Inevitability Theory," says Mark Stokes, the executive director of the Project 2049 think tank, which focuses on security in Asia, and a former U.S. defense official. "Beijing says it’s inevitable [that the two sides] will fulfill **reunification** on China’s terms, and they actually believe it. The idea is: If Taiwan is going to be eaten up by China anyway, why do we want to risk the trouble?" Inevitable or not, Beijing still faces the challenge of convincing Taiwan that unification is beneficial — and convincing its own people that patience continues to be the best strategy. For the last 20 years, most Taiwanese have [favored](http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/tonduID.htm) the tenuous status quo over declaring independence or reunifying with the mainland, according to data from the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan. From 2012 to 2013, the number of Taiwanese wanting to maintain the status quo but eventually move toward independence rose from 15.1 percent to 17.9 percent, while 2.1 percent wanted immediate unification. This may be a gain for the pro-independence side, but roughly 58 percent of Taiwanese still don’t want things to change. These numbers are far less favorable to China than the most relevant comparison: Britain’s return of Hong Kong to the mainland in 1997. In February 1993, 42 percent of Hong Kongers [wanted](http://www.hktp.org/list/first_5_yrs.pdf) to join China, while 25 percent wanted independence, according to the Hong Kong Transition Project, a research organization. In the weeks before the handover, as people adjusted to the new reality, those numbers changed to 53 and 17 percent, respectively. But Beijing and London agreed to return Hong Kong in 1984; the mainland had 13 years of preparation to make it palatable. As China and Taiwan continue to move closer together, Beijing may feel like it lacks the luxury of time it had with Hong Kong. "The political pressures on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan are tremendous and growing. In the past, Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the United States from selling weapons to Taiwan. Now many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior," wrote Jia Qingguo, associate dean at the school of international studies at Peking University, in the 2014 book Debating China. "Because national unification is an important source of political legitimacy, the [Communist Party] could face a serious domestic **political crisis** if it does not handle the Taiwan issue deftly." Xi Jinping, China’s most powerful and assertive leader in decades, may be keen on resolving the issue once and for all. In October 2013, Xi [said](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xiapec/2013-10/06/content_17011186.htm) the problems caused by the cross-strait issue should not be handed on from generation to generation. "The question is, was Xi shifting away from [his predecessor] Hu Jintao’s policy of patience?" asks Alan D. Romberg, director of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center and a former State Department official. Internationally, too, the timing is propitious. As tensions increase between China and its neighbors over territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, "this has diverted the attention away from Taiwan — very few people talk about it anymore," says Stokes. (Both China and Taiwan agree that the Diaoyu, the disputed islands that Japan administers and calls the Senkaku, belong to Taiwan. The only marked difference between China’s and Taiwan’s claim is who owns Taiwan.) There’s increased pressure to make progress before Ma — who will likely be succeeded by a less China-friendly politician — leaves office in 2016. So what will China do? Beijing’s representative at the Feb. 11 meeting, Zhang Zhijun, [said](http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/11/uk-china-taiwan-idUKBREA1A0G920140211) both sides should have "a little more imagination" without elaborating. The only concrete takeaway so far is that both sides have agreed to set up representative offices "as soon as possible," though it is unclear when. One thing "imagination" probably does not mean is war: It is extremely unlikely that China will invade Taiwan in the near term. The mountainous island would have a lot of advantages in that fight. The Taiwanese could focus on asymmetrical capabilities, good beach defenses, and smaller units that are difficult to target. Even if the United States decided not to intervene, a Chinese victory would not be assured. In October 2013, Taiwan released a national defense report [stating](http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/10/09/2003574061) that Beijing would be able to mount a comprehensive cross-strait offensive by 2020. If China were to succeed in a military campaign against Taiwan, it would create a tremendous amount of resentment, not only in Taiwan, but around the region — belying Beijing’s assertion that China’s rise will be peaceful. Ultimately, China will win if it can convince Taiwan to give in without a fight: through economic cooperation, technology sharing, and, if Beijing can improve its image, a chance for Taiwan to be a part of greater China. "The whole point of China’s policy is to try to create an environment where people in Taiwan want to unify," said Romberg. For Taiwan, the **greatest danger** is not **military attack**, but that Beijing "might exploit its growing power to ‘**intimidate Taiwan into submission’** on China’s terms," Richard Bush, a former head of the American Institute of Taiwan, the private corporation that manages U.S. interests on the island, [said](http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/01/16/2003581393) in January, according to the newspaper Taipei Times. Chen of National Chengchi University believes "the only option — indeed a risky one — is to **engage China**, further integrate into her economic and social systems, and change her political and ideological architecture from within." A liberalized or democratic China would treat Taiwan differently — but drastic political change in Beijing is unlikely. "Barring an unexpected event, the prospects for **continued independence** in Taiwan **do not look good**," Dreyer says. As China continues to **expand in influence**, the world increasingly sees the Middle Kingdom, rather than the United States, as the future. When large numbers of Taiwanese begin to do the same, **that’s checkmate**.

**BUT, a decline in Chinese strength triggers great power conflict – they’ll delay a confrontation now but the perception that their window is closing forces them to lash out**

**Brands 21** – Professor of Global Affairs, JHU SAIS, Hal Brands, Henry Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Michael Beckley, associate professor of political science at Tufts University and a Jeane Kirkpatrick visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem: The United States needs to prepare for a major war, not because its rival is rising but because of the opposite., 24 September 2021, *Foreign Policy*, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/

Why do great powers fight great wars? The conventional answer is a story of rising challengers and declining hegemons. An ascendant power, which chafes at the rules of the existing order, gains ground on an established power—the country that made those rules. Tensions multiply; tests of strength ensue. The outcome is a spiral of fear and hostility leading, almost inevitably, to conflict. “The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable,” the ancient historian Thucydides wrote—a truism now invoked, ad nauseum, in explaining the U.S.-China rivalry.

The idea of a Thucydides Trap, popularized by Harvard political scientist Graham Allison, holds that the danger of war will skyrocket as a surging China overtakes a sagging America. Even Chinese President Xi Jinping has endorsed the concept arguing Washington must make room for Beijing. As tensions between the United States and China escalate, the **belief that the fundamental cause of friction is a looming “power transition**”—the replacement of one hegemon by another—has become canonical.

**The only problem** with this familiar formula **is** that **it’s wrong**.

The Thucydides Trap doesn’t really explain what caused the Peloponnesian War. It **doesn’t capture the dynamics** **that have often driven revisionist powers**—whether that is Germany in 1914 or Japan in 1941—to start some of history’s most devastating conflicts. And **it doesn’t explain why war is a very real possibility in U.S.-China relations today** because it **fundamentally misdiagnoses where China now finds itself on its arc of development**—the point at which its relative power is peaking and will soon start to fade.

There’s indeed a deadly trap that could ensnare the United States and China. But it’s not the product of a power transition the Thucydidean cliché says it is. It’s **best thought of instead as a “peaking power trap.”** And if history is any guide, **it’s China’s—not the United States’—impending decline that could cause it to snap shut.**

The retreat of the Athenians from Syracuse in the Peloponnesian War

There is an entire swath of literature, known as “power transition theory,” which holds that great-power war typically occurs at the intersection of one hegemon’s rise and another’s decline. This is the body of work underpinning the Thucydides Trap, and there is, admittedly, an elemental truth to the idea. The rise of new powers is invariably destabilizing. In the runup to the Peloponnesian War in the 5th century B.C., Athens would not have seemed so menacing to Sparta had it not built a vast empire and become a naval superpower. Washington and Beijing would not be locked in rivalry if China was still poor and weak. Rising powers do expand their influence in ways that threaten reigning powers.

But the calculus that produces war—particularly the calculus that pushes revisionist powers, countries seeking to shake up the existing system, to lash out violently—is more complex. A country whose relative wealth and power are growing will surely become more assertive and ambitious. All things equal, it will seek greater global influence and prestige. **But if its position is steadily improving,** **it should postpone a deadly showdown** **with the reigning hegemon** until it has become even stronger. Such a country should follow the dictum former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping laid down for a rising China after the Cold War: It should hide its capabilities and bide its time.

Now **imagine a different scenario**. **A dissatisfied state** has been building its power and expanding its geopolitical horizons. **But then the country peaks**, perhaps **because its economy slows**, perhaps because its **own assertiveness provokes a coalition** **of determined rivals,** or perhaps because both of these things happen at once. The future starts to look quite forbidding; a sense of imminent danger starts to replace a feeling of limitless possibility. In these circumstances, a revisionist power **may act boldly, even aggressively**, **to grab what it can before it is too late**. The most dangerous trajectory in world politics is a long rise followed by the prospect of a sharp decline.

As we show in our forthcoming book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, this scenario is more common than you might think. Historian Donald Kagan showed, for instance, that Athens started acting more belligerently in the years before the Peloponnesian War because it feared adverse shifts in the balance of naval power—in other words, because it was **on the verge of losing influence** vis-à-vis Sparta. We see the same thing in more recent cases as well.

**Over the past 150 years**, peaking powers—great powers that had been growing dramatically faster than the world average **and then suffered a severe, prolonged slowdown**—usually **don’t fade away quietly**. Rather, they become **brash and aggressive**. They suppress dissent at home and try to regain economic momentum by creating exclusive spheres of influence abroad. They pour money into their militaries and use force to expand their influence. This behavior commonly provokes great-power tensions. In some cases, it touches disastrous wars.

This shouldn’t be surprising. Eras of rapid growth supercharge a country’s ambitions, raise its people’s expectations, and make its rivals nervous. During a sustained economic boom, businesses enjoy rising profits and citizens get used to living large. The country becomes a bigger player on the global stage. Then stagnation strikes.

Slowing growth **makes it harder for leaders to keep the public happy**. Economic underperformance weakens the country against its rivals. **Fearing upheaval**, **leaders crack down on dissent**. They **maneuver desperately to keep geopolitical enemies at bay**. Expansion seems like a solution—a way of grabbing economic resources and markets, making nationalism a crutch for a wounded regime, and beating back foreign threats.

**2NC – AT: Military Confrontation Inevitable**

**Xi has signaled that while force isn’t off the table, China prefers unification through economic integration**

**Chang 20** – a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University Chia-Chien Chang and Alan H. Yang, “Weaponized Interdependence: China's Economic Statecraft and Social Penetration against Taiwan,” Orbis, 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7102596/

On January 2, 2019, Chinese leader Xi Jinping delivered a speech on the 40 th Anniversary of the Issuance of the Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, unveiling the People's Republic of China's **primary strategies toward** the Republic of China (**Taiwan**). In the speech, Xi stated that the reunification of Taiwan is the foundation for China's national rejuvenation and the “China dream.” To fulfill China's ambition, Xi emphasized, China will not renounce the use of force and will reserve the option of taking all necessary measures. **More importantly**, China will be eager to **promote the reunification** **through a variety of means**, including institutionalizing **cross-Strait trade and economic cooperation**, **creating a common market**, **and granting favored treatment to “compatriots” in Taiwan.** Furthermore, China is seeking to influence public opinion in Taiwan by “forging closer bonds of heart and mind” through various social exchanges and communication. Xi's speech reveals that, in a world of interdependence, both economic statecraft and social penetration have become two crucial strategies for China to expand its sphere of influence over Taiwan.

Xi's policy statement is just the tip of the iceberg for China's broader socio-economic statecraft. Economic globalization and technological revolution have created various forms of global connectivity, including trade, investment, infrastructure, digital, and people-to-people connectivity. Those interconnections not only facilitate China's national development, but they also enable Beijing to conduct comprehensive economic manipulation and social penetration all over the world. For instance, China curtailed the import of Japanese autos in 2012 to protest Japan's policy toward the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China also banned the import of Philippine bananas to retaliate against the Philippines’ policy regarding the South China Sea dispute. In 2017, to signal its disapproval of Seoul's decision to accept the U.S. bid to deploy the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, the Chinese government halted Chinese group tours to South Korea and implicitly supported a domestic boycott of South Korean goods. In addition, China has provided significant financial assistance to countries in Africa and Latin America in exchange for their support. Furthermore, Beijing has launched numerous social exchange programs worldwide, including cultural, educational, professional, journalistic, and think-tank exchanges. Those programs usually include all-expenses-paid events, job opportunities (offered by Chinese companies), and financial rewards. They help cultivate an international group for China's “Grand External Propaganda” (大外宣, dà wài xuān) China's global strategy of public diplomacy. Finally, as senior fellow and director of China strategy at the Brookings Rush Doshi points out, China is attempting to utilize its financial muscle and technology to influence every stage of global information supply chains.

Clearly, China's economic statecraft and social penetration are **different from using coercive hard power based on brute force**. They should not be considered as “soft power,” a notion Harvard scholar Joseph Nye uses to describe the power of attraction based on values, culture, institutions, and policies. In essence, China seeks to manipulate the target country by creating economic dependence and by penetrating the target's society. China is certainly not the first country to embrace these strategies. What makes it special, however, is how China uses its position in the global networks in conducting this sort of statecraft. China exploits global connectivity and weaponizes interdependence between countries, creating the structural foundation of its economic statecraft and social-penetration operations.

**Xi perceives reunification as inevitable AND wants to pursue peaceful reunification BUT increased military force causes China to backlash, NO MATTER THE COSTS**

**Zhou 4-12** [Michael Zhou is pursuing a master of science in contemporary Chinese studies at the University of Oxford. Michael’s research interests lie in examining US-China strategic competition, particularly the role of Chinese historical analogies in China’s foreign policy and international relations. He also takes an interest in understanding China’s contemporary soft power strategy in Southeast Asia, 04-12-2022, 3 reasons China won’t forcibly reunify with Taiwan any time soon, South China Morning Post, https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3173757/three-reasons-china-will-not-forcibly-reunify-taiwan-any-time-soon] Eric

The third strategic consideration for Beijing is that its leaders say they remain committed **to peaceful reunification**. In a televised speech at the 110th anniversary of China’s 1911 revolution, which overthrew the Qing dynasty and turned China into a republic, Xi [said](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3151755/chinese-president-xi-jinping-says-peaceful-reunification-taiwan?module=inline&pgtype=article) peaceful reunification is in the mainland and Taiwan’s best interests.

At a press conference last month during the National People’s Congress, Li pledged to advance peaceful growth in relations with Taiwan and “reunification”, though he also stressed that China remained firmly opposed to [separatist activities](https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3152544/will-beijing-sharpen-its-laws-punish-taiwan-separatists?module=inline&pgtype=article) and foreign interference.

Chinese leaders’ emphasis on maintaining peaceful **cross-strait relations** **carries historical logic**. In Chinese history, civil wars are often associated with turbulence and chaos.

An illustrative example is the Chinese civil war fought between the Communists and Nationalists. Under the mantra that Chinese people should not fight against their own, the Communist Party criticised the ruling Nationalist government for throwing the country into the cauldron of civil war and bringing more suffering to the people.

Back then, the mantra represented people’s anti-war sentiment and explained why the Nationalist government gradually lost the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. Showing aggression against your own compatriots, therefore, would be morally wrong and politically unviable. The Communist Party would be careful not to follow in the Nationalist government’s footsteps.

Peaceful reunification with Taiwan would **lend greater credence** to Beijing’s efforts at projecting an image as a benign, responsible global power. It would also help to bring clarity to China’s intentions and ambitions.

China’s image problem, the need for stability to address domestic woes and the weight of history **should weigh on Beijing’s strategic calculations**. These should caution Chinese leaders against an invasion of Taiwan. Reunification with Taiwan is just one of many priorities and issues that leaders in Zhongnanhai have on their agenda.

However, **the above strategic considerations** **would only work barring any unexpected geopolitical developments** or crises that might exhaust China’s patience **or violate one of its “red lines”.** Should Taiwan declare independence or **the US increase its military presence** in the Taiwan Strait, **Beijing will not hesitate to use force, whatever the costs might be.**

**2NC – AT: Reunification Not Inevitable**

**Xi perceives reunification as inevitable AND wants to pursue peaceful reunification BUT increased military force causes China to backlash, NO MATTER THE COSTS**

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**Chinese mil mod makes long term U.S abandonment inevitable.**

Alexia **Frangopoulos 19**. 9-22-2019. Writer for the Harvard Political Review. "Modernizing the Military: China’s Path to Hegemony?" http://harvardpolitics.com/world/china-modern-military/

In the tunnels of the “Underground Great Wall” are stacked hundreds of **nuclear ICBMs**, hidden from the eyes of the world. This 5,000 kilometer passageway is just one part of China’s plan to **modernize** and increase the size, power, and efficiency of its already gargantuan military. In 2019, the People’s Liberation Army’s annual defense budget was 1.19 trillion yuan ($177.5 billion), up 7.5 percent from last year’s defense budget. China is allocating **increasing amounts** of money to programs and initiatives that increase the **quantity** and **quality** of their military weapons. The Defense Department claims that one of its most recent developments — the New Type 055 guided missile destroyer — is akin to the United States’ marine destroyers. Additionally, the PLA is growing its stockpile of nuclear weapons. Dean Cheng, an expert in the Chinese military at the Heritage Foundation, commented in an interview with the HPR that “China’s ICBM force currently is very limited, maybe 50. But there are reports … that suggest that China is engaged with a longer term nuclear modernization program that will also expand the number of nuclear weapons it fields.” In April 2017, Beijing announced that one of its aircraft carriers had reached the final stage of testing, with two others under production. That would bring China to a total of four aircraft carriers by 2022. Though this may not compare to the U.S. Navy’s 10 functional aircraft carriers — out of a fleet of 19 deployable carriers — this **rapid growth** does indicate China’s commitment to quickly expand and modernize its army in order to **protect** its **national interests** and weaken the United States’ influence in Asia. Competition in the South China Sea Part of the reason for the PLA’s rapid military modernization effort seems to be its interest in maintaining authority in the South China Sea by decreasing U.S. influence there. The South China Sea is a long-contested territory; in 1947, China announced its eleven-dash policy (which it amended in the 1950s to a “nine-dash” policy), declaring Chinese jurisdiction over almost 90 percent of the Sea. However, the nine-dash policy is not internationally recognized, and China’s territorial claims overlap with the competing claims advanced by five other countries bordering the South China Sea. The South China Sea connects China to Africa and Europe, allowing the People’s Republic to efficiently transport its exports. Over 40 percent of China’s trade is transported through the Sea because of its easy access to global markets. ChinaPower estimated that if the Strait of Malacca, a thin strip of water that creates a path to Europe and Africa from Asia, was blocked due to alternate South China Sea borders, Chinese transporters would pay an additional $64.5 million per week. The water route also allows creates a simple path for importing oil into China. More than 80 percent of Chinese oil imports sail across the South China Sea before docking at a Chinese port. The South China Sea does more than support trade — it provides a new source of valuable resources like natural gas and oil. Scientists estimate that there are between 11 and 22 billion barrels of oil under the Sea. By growing its military, especially the Navy, the Chinese government can thwart the five feuding countries that claim control over parts of the South China Sea. Michael Chase, a researcher at the RAND Corporation, told the HPR, “Their focus has really been on having the military capabilities that lets them deter challenges to their influence by their neighbors or the United States.” The recent trend of Chinese military modernization seems at least partially motivated by a desire to intimidate smaller countries that might otherwise seek to compete with China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. “One China” President Xi has already vocalized his intention of **reuniting Taiwan** with the mainland to create “One China.” However, the United States presents an obstacle to this vision. Currently, the United States maintains an unofficial embassy in Taiwan — the American Institute in Taiwan — which provides a dose of political deterrence to China’s behavior in the region and legitimizes claims of Taiwanese independence. Additionally, the United States allowed the Taiwanese president, Tsai Ing-wen, to stop in New York on July 11, 2019 — a highly unusual move. In the past, to maintain its respectful diplomatic ties with China, the United States would disallow the Taiwanese president from touching down on U.S. land. Though the United States has solidified U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic ties over recent years, the **growth** of the PLA may **rupture** that budding relationship. On June 14, the PLA conducted military exercises on China’s Southeast Coast, near the Taiwan Strait. The exercises were a **response** to a $2.2 billion **arms deal** between the United States and Taiwan, indicating China’s willingness to intervene over Taiwan with military force. When President Trump did not cancel the deal at China’s request — and instead started negotiations to sell **Taiwan F-16 fighter jets** — the PLA promptly conducted another set of **military exercises** near the Taiwan Strait on July 29. If China develops this **herculean** military, the United States might be forced to **reconsider** its support for Taiwanese independence. Faced with a bolstered Chinese military, the United States may become **less likely** to get involved in Taiwan-China disputes — a stronger Chinese military could certainly **splinter** the current strength of U.S.-Taiwan relations. A stronger PLA could also discourage the Taiwanese government from any attempts at declaring independence. On January 2, 2019, Xi offered Taiwan a “one country, two systems” model — if Taiwan is willing to unite peacefully. Thus if China gains a “first class military” like Xi has promised, Taiwan becomes more likely to accept the **peaceful deal**, due to the new threat posed by its superior military. If the Chinese military presence in the region becomes as strong and capable as the United States’ has been, U.S. support for Taiwanese independence would quickly become less reassuring. The threat of possible military intervention by the PLA may be the factor that pushes **reunification**. China’s undisputed control over the South China Sea and reunification with Taiwan would significantly decrease U.S. influence in the Asian region, reversing the historically large U.S. presence in Asia.

**No Info = Accidents/Crashes**

**Lack of info sharing causes sub-crashes.**

**Mitchell 14** – Paul T. Mitchell is a Professor in the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College. ("The Contribution of Submarines to Canada’s Freedom of Action on the World Stage," Summer 2014, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol14/no3/PDF/CMJ143Ep15.pdf, Accessed 7-1-2022, LASA-SC)

Byers argues that the exclusive submarine forums in which the **RCN** participates with its **closest allies** can be preserved in the absence of strict possession of these systems. Of course, this is just his opinion, as no evidence is provided that such arrangements would, in fact, be possible. While he speculates that essentially it would be in the **interest of Canada’s allies** to continue to cooperate due to safety and search and rescue issues, especially in the Arctic, he fails to understand that waterspace management is not about search and rescue, but **rather about route deconfliction**. Allies participating in submarine waterspace management do not specifically reveal where each of their submarines are at any given moment. Waterspace management is all about the **safe operation** of **submarines** among friendly partners to **ensure that their submarines do not collide with each other**, or are detected as unknown and potentially hostile targets.19 Remove Canadian submarines from the game, and there is no longer a ‘need to know’ basis for sharing information. In terms of their most highly guarded secrets, nations do not operate on the basis of charity. This was made dramatically evident to Canada in 2003 when its decision to abstain from the Iraq invasion caused the momentary loss of all military information sharing with the United States.20 New Zealand still feels the reverberations of its decision to ban US naval vessels from its ports in the 1980s. While the concept of ‘need to share’ has been in vogue since the events of 9/11, it has never been fully embraced, and information sharing, even in organizations such as NORAD, where Canadian and American operations are completely integrated and command and control is shared, remains problematic.21 Even in terms of waterspace management, **not all information is shared among allies**, as the collision between HMS Vanguard and the French SSBN Le Triomphant demonstrates.22 Further, Canada’s decision to eschew offensive cyber capabilities for its armed forces has limited cyber cooperation with ‘Four-Eyes’ allies. Getting out of the submarine business would most certainly end any role for Canada in allied waterspace management. Byers also dismisses Canadian naval cooperation with the USN as unnecessary, given that the US could find other NATO partners to conduct ASW training against conventional diesel powered submarines. While this is undoubtedly true, it misses the whole point of why such training is conducted in the first place. The US benefits from training against Canada’s conventional submarines, but our navy (and air force) also gain significant benefits from these activities. Canada’s navy is rightly regarded as a world class professional force, despite its small size. Such professionalism makes Canadian ships highly desired in multinational formations, and has also allowed the RCN to lead those formations in many instances. International cooperation is a critical aspect of maintaining this level of world class professionalism. Furthermore, given the highly technical nature of submarine operations, working with American units is a **key way to ensure that our submarine crews are every bit as good as their colleagues on the surface**.

**ADV CP**

**1NC—Drones**

**Drones solve—the ultimate ASW tech**

**Bajema 7/16** - Dr. Natasha Bajema has held long-term assignments at the National Defense University, in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. She's currently Director of the Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks. (“WILL AI STEAL SUBMARINES’ STEALTH?,” IEEE Spectrum, 16 JUL 2022, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/nuclear-submarine)//mcu>

One way to get around the need for precise placement is to make the sensors mobile. **Underwater drone swarms can do just that, which is why some experts have proposed them as the ultimate antisubmarine capability.** Clark, for instance, notes that such drones now have enhanced computing power and batteries that can last for two weeks between charges. The U.S. Navy is working on a drone that could run for 90 days. Drones are also now equipped with the chemical, optical, and geomagnetic sensors mentioned earlier. Networked **underwater drones, perhaps working in conjunction with airborne drones, may be useful for not only detecting submarines but also destroying them,** which is why several militaries are investing heavily in them.A photo of a plane on a runway. A U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon aircraft, equipped to detect submarines, awaits refueling in Okinawa, Japan, in 2020. U.S.NAVY For example, the Chinese Navy has invested in a fishlike undersea drone known as Robo-Shark, which was designed specifically for hunting submarines. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy is developing the Low-Cost Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Swarming Technology, for conducting surveillance missions. Each Locust drone weighs about 6 kilograms, costs $15,000, and can be outfitted with MAD sensors; it can skim low over the ocean’s surface to detect signals under the water. Militaries study the drone option because it might work. Then again, it very well might not.

**2NC—Satellites**

**SAR sensors detect submarine wake patterns**

**Bajema 7/16** - Dr. Natasha Bajema has held long-term assignments at the National Defense University, in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. She's currently Director of the Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks. (“WILL AI STEAL SUBMARINES’ STEALTH?,” IEEE Spectrum, 16 JUL 2022, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/nuclear-submarine)//mcu>

Gower believes a more powerful means of submarine detection lies in the “persistent coverage of the Earth’s surface by commercial satellites,” which he says “represents the most substantial shift in our detection capabilities compared to the past.” More than 2,800 of these satellites are already in orbit. Governments once dominated space because the cost of building and launching satellites was so great. These days, much cheaper satellite technology is available, and private companies are launching constellations of tens to thousands of satellites that can work together to image every bit of the Earth’s surface. They are outfitted with a wide range of sensing technologies, including synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which scans a scene down below while moving over a great distance, providing results like those you’d get from an extremely long antenna. Since these satellite constellations view the same locations multiple times per day, they can capture small changes in activity. Experts have known for decades about the possibility of detecting submarines with **SAR based on the wake patterns** they form as they move through the ocean. To detect such patterns, known as Bernoulli humps and Kelvin wakes, the U.S. Navy has invested in the AN/APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor, developed by Raytheon. The aircraft-mounted radar is designed to operate at low altitudes and appears to be equipped with high-resolution SAR and lidar sensors.

**1NC—Unilat**

**Recent tests prove US unilateral ability**

Megan **Eckstein 21**, Megan Eckstein has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs, and budgets, 8/24/21, “US Navy completes testing of littoral combat ship’s minesweeper system,” *Defense News*, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/navy-league/2021/08/24/us-navy-completes-testing-of-littoral-combat-ships-minesweeper-system/

**The U.S. Navy has completed the initial operational test and evaluation of its Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) program**, bringing a key element of the littoral combat ship’s mine countermeasures mission package closer to final approval and fielding.

The UISS system is a Textron-made **mine countermeasures unmanned surface vessel (MCM USV**) towing a minesweeper. The system works by sending the unmanned vehicle into a potential mine field — with the manned LCS or other host ship at a safe distance — and using the USV to “mow the lawn” up and down the area of interest, with the influence sweep setting off any magnetic, acoustic, or magnetic/acoustic combination mines in the area.

The sweep system is among the original requirements for the LCS mine countermeasures mission package, even as the mission package overall has seen several changes over the past decade of development and testing.

The Navy announced Aug. 24 it conducted at-sea testing aboard LCS Manchester off the coast of California in May and June. The test event included both “end-to-end minesweeping missions versus Navy Instrumented Threat Targets (NAVITTARs) and demonstrated UISS supportability and integration with the LCS seaframe,” according to a Naval Sea Systems Command statement.

Additional pier-side testing took place to look at requirements like maintenance ahead of the Navy declaring initial operational capability and beginning to field the USV and minesweeper to the fleet.

“Completion of this operational test event achieves a major milestone for the UISS Program of Record and demonstrates continued progress to fielding the full capability of the MCM Mission Package aboard LCS,” Capt. Gus Weekes, LCS Mission Modules Program Manager, said in the statement.

“The test event demonstrated for the first time both the capability and sustainability of a minesweeping capability using an unmanned system from an LCS in an operationally realistic environment,” he added. “I want to highlight the adaptability and dedication of the test teams across many organizations in executing these critical tests, despite the challenges imposed by COVID-19.”

**US Navy can deploy MCM now**

Max **Hauptman 22**, Max Hauptman has been covering breaking news at Task & Purpose since December 2021. He previously worked at The Washington Post as a Military Veterans in Journalism Fellow, 1/6/22, “The Navy’s next-gen unmanned minesweeper passed a critical test: It didn’t blow up,” *Task and Purpose*, https://taskandpurpose.com/news/navy-ship-minesweeper-doesnt-sink-test/

**The Navy’s next generation of unmanned minesweepers passed an important** test this week: not sinking when close to a large, underwater explosion. Important when your business is finding and blowing up underwater mines.

The Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) ships have no crew — they’re [drone boats](https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2020/navy/2020uiss-usv-usss.pdf?ver=AYnmVr-2qiW6qtmSDJ9FRA%3D%3D) — and are designed to be launched from [Littoral Combat Ships](https://taskandpurpose.com/news/navy-littoral-combat-ship-problems/) or piloted from shore, operating remotely and using acoustic and magnetic countermeasures to detect mines.

“**Completion of these tests showcased the capability and resiliency of the MCM USV**, and is a critical milestone for the program,” said Program Manager Capt. Godfrey “Gus” Weekes in a Navy [press statement](https://www.navsea.navy.mil/Media/News/SavedNewsModule/Article/2887665/uiss-conducts-successful-underwater-explosion-shock-test/). “The MCM USV is the centerpiece of the MCM mission package, and **this test demonstrates the final steps we’re taking for MCM** mission package IOT&E and fielding.”

The underwater explosion shock test was carried out by the Aberdeen Test Center and the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Carderock. The UISS has been under evaluation by the Navy for several years, part of the branch’s plan to upgrade its mine-detection capabilities. It would replace the Avenger-class ships and MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters in the Navy’s minesweeping mission.

The **Navy currently operates eight Avenger-class**[**minesweepers**](https://taskandpurpose.com/news/iran-naval-minesweepers/) – four in Japan, and four in Bahrain, patrolling the Persian Gulf. Cramped and constantly in need of maintenance, they are among the oldest ships in the fleet, running navigation systems off of Windows 2000. It’s not the most glamorous mission, and the ships seem to be at the bottom of the list when it comes to the Navy’s procurement and updates. As one sailor [told](https://www.propublica.org/article/iran-has-hundreds-of-naval-mines-us-navy-minesweepers-find-old-dishwashers-car-parts) ProPublica in 2019, “We are essentially the ships that the Navy forgot.”

In 2019, one of the minesweepers stationed in Bahrain [caught fire](https://taskandpurpose.com/news/navy-ship-fire/) while docked in Bahrain.

The Avenger-class has eclipsed its projected retirement date, and the minesweeping mission — if overlooked — remains one of great importance to the fleet. The Persian Gulf, through which millions of gallons of oil pass through on tankers every year, is also a volatile region. It’s a sea route that has been heavily mined, and U.S. ships have [fired](https://taskandpurpose.com/news/navy-fires-warning-shots-iran-persian-gulf/) warning shots at Iranian vessels. Yet one sailor on an Avenger-class boat [reported](https://www.propublica.org/article/iran-has-hundreds-of-naval-mines-us-navy-minesweepers-find-old-dishwashers-car-parts) to ProPublica that Navy minesweepers had trouble distinguishing between crab traps and mines.

**Scheduled to begin operating in 2022**, the UISS has at least passed a critical test for any vessel: not sinking when it finds a target.

**1NC --- Canada CP Solvency---ASW---Arctic**

**US-Canada cooperation solves---it creates comprehensive ASW with an integrated sensor network.**

R.E. **Woodards 14**. Lieutenant-Commander for the Canadian Armed Forces. “Back to the Future: NORAD, Sovereignty and Anti-Submarine Warfare in the Arctic.” CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE. 2014. https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/301/305/woodards.pdf //EM

Conclusion

**M**aritime **D**omain **A**wareness has been **submitted as the answer** to the looming friction in the Arctic. Although embraced by both nations, this extension **falls short** of total defense due to its **nonconventional** surface vessel focus and **limit sense only functionality**. Unlike the subsurface incursions of the cold war, the **current and future** Arctic environments provide a **venue for hostile submarines** to subvert freedom of movement in the maritime domain, additionally unchecked subsurface traffic within Canada’s claimed territorial waters pose a direct threat to sovereign claims. Unfortunately, both the **U**nited **S**tates and Canada are **behind** in establishing a **comprehensive approach** to **A**nti-**S**ubmarine **W**arfare in the Arctic. To date, there exists **no assignment** of areas of **responsibility** or response plans for **unwanted subsurface** Arctic incursions. The extant threat from widely proliferated conventional and nuclear submarine technology highlights North America’s vulnerability in the underwater domain. As the number of submarines capable of **transiting** below the Arctic ice **increases globally**, in the interests of defending North America the **U**nited **S**tates and Canada must **accelerate** the development of an **acoustic and non-acoustic network** focused on **a**nti-**s**ubmarine **w**arfare that is supported by a **thoroughly exercised** reaction force able to **thwart threats** from beneath the sea. Additionally, assignment of appropriate anti-submarine warfare assets and advances in current technology are required to complete this complex mission in an Arctic environment. This essay has highlighted through ample data the impending influx of submarine operations in the Arctic additionally deducing some of the current and future challenges and vulnerabilities. From the **structural perspective** of command, if the Arctic’s is to be **defended** against subsurface threats by Canada and the **U**nited **S**tates, a NORAD **monitored integrated** network of sensors **established** to detect, and track subsurface targets is **required**. An additional requirement is for NORAD to retain the capacity to **assign assets** able to **act upon** this **cueing data**. The establishment of this NORAD commanded network must culminate in annual exercises to demonstrate the extant capability and as an act of strategic deterrence.

**CBMs CP**

<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2021.1903763>

forsalnd

* Cooperatiin weth russia decreases/reduces their need to reduce aggressibvley—It nullifies them
  + Russia acts aggressive because they want inscetnives from the US
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**1NC—CBM**

**The United States federal government should establish an international autonomous incidents agreement with Russia over artificial intelligence in antisubmarine warfare.**

**CMBs solve, they don’t have to be internationally binding, even if Russia says no US unilateral action solves**

**Horowitz and Scharre 21** – Horowitz Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American; won the 2017 Karl Deutsch Award given by the International Studies Association for early career contributions to the fields of international relations and peace research; research interests include the intersection of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics with global politics, military innovation, the role of leaders in international politics, and geopolitical forecasting methodology; worked for Department of Defense and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. received his PhD in government from Harvard University and his BA in political science from Emory University. Scharre a Senior Fellow and Director at CNAS; worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense establishing policies on autonomous systems and emerging weapons technologies; holds a PhD in war studies from King’s College London and an MA in political economy and public policy and a BS in physics (Michael Horowitz and Paul Scharre, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” Center for New American Security, January 2021, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures)//mcu>

There are inherent risks when autonomous systems with any level of decision-making interact with adversary forces in contested areas. Given the brittleness of algorithms, the deployment of autonomous systems in a crisis situation could increase the risk of accidents and miscalculation. AI-related CBMs could build on Cold War agreements to reduce the risk of accidental escalation, with some modification to account for the new challenges AI-enabled autonomous systems present. States have long used established “rules of the road” to govern the interaction of military forces operating with a high degree of autonomy, such as at naval vessels at sea, and there may be similar value in such a CBM for interactions with AI-enabled autonomous systems. The 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement and older “rules of the road” such as maritime prize law provide useful historical examples for how nations have managed analogous challenges in the past. Building on these historical examples, states could adopt a modern-day “international autonomous incidents agreement” that focuses on military applications of autonomous systems, especially in the air and **maritime environments**. Such an agreement could help reduce risks from accidental escalation by autonomous systems, as well as reduce ambiguity about the extent of human intention behind the behavior of autonomous systems. In addition to the Incidents at Sea Agreement, maritime prize law is another useful historical analogy for how states might craft a rule set for autonomous systems’ interactions. Prize law, which first began in the 12th century and evolved more fully among European states in the 15th to 19th centuries, regulated how ships interacted during wartime. Because both warships and privateers, as a practical matter, operated with a high degree of autonomy while at sea, prize law consisted of a set of rules governing acceptable wartime behavior. Rules covered which ships could be attacked, ships’ markings for identification, the use of force, seizure of cargo, and providing for the safety of ships’ crews.61 Nations face an analogous challenge with autonomous systems as they become increasingly integrated into military forces. Autonomous systems will be operating on their own for some period of time, potentially interacting with assets from other nations, including competitors, and there could be value in establishing internationally agreed upon “rules of the road” for how such systems should interact. The goal of such an agreement, which **would not have to be as formal** as the Incidents at Sea Agreement, **would be to increase predictability and reduce ambiguity about the behavior of autonomous systems.** Such an **agreement could be legally binding but would not necessarily need to be in order to be useful**. It would likely need to be codified in an agreement (or set of agreements), however, so that expectations are clear by all parties. An ideal set of rules would be self-enforcing, such that it is against one’s own interests to violate them. Examples of rules of this kind in warfare include prohibitions against perfidy62 and giving “no quarter,”63 violating either of which incentivizes the enemy to engage in counterproductive behavior, such as refusing to recognize surrender or fighting to the bitter end rather than surrendering. An **autonomous incidents agreement could also include provisions for information-sharing about potential deployments of autonomous systems in disputed areas and mechanisms for consultation** at the military-to-military level to resolve questions that arise (**including** potentially **a hotline** to respond to incidents in real time). One challenge with autonomous systems is that their autonomous programming is not immediately observable and inspectable from the outside, a major hurdle for verifying compliance with arms control. One benefit to an international rule set that governs the behavior of autonomous systems, particularly in peacetime or pre-conflict settings, is that the outward behavior of the system would be observable, even if its code is not. Other nations could see how another country’s autonomous air, ground, or maritime drone behaves and whether it is complying with the rules, depending on how the rules are written. One benefit to an international rule set that governs the behavior of autonomous systems, particularly in peacetime or pre-conflict settings, is that the outward behavior of the system would be observable, even if its code is not. Given the perceived success of the Incidents at Sea Agreement in decreasing the risk of accidental and inadvertent escalation between the United States and the Soviet Union, **an equivalent agreement in the AI space might have potential to do the same for a new generation**. The efficacy of any agreement would depend on the details, both in the agreement itself and in states’ execution. For example, the United States and China have signed multiple CBM agreements involving air and maritime deconfliction of military forces, including the 1998 U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and the 2014 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, yet U.S.-China air and naval incidents have continued.64 However, the existence of these prior agreements themselves may be a positive sign about the potential for U.S.-China cooperation on preventing accidents and could be a building block for further collaboration. Moreover, in a February 2020 article, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo in China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) advocated for CBMs between the United States and China, including on military AI, drawing on the example of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement.65 Interest in at least some quarters in the Chinese military suggests that cooperation may be possible even in the midst of competition, especially if the PLA is willing to reciprocate American transparency.66 In the absence of an internationally agreed upon common rule set, a country could unilaterally make declaratory statements about the behavior of its autonomous systems. For example, a country could say, “If you fire at our autonomous ship/aircraft/vehicle, it will fire back defensively.”67 In principle, such a rule could incentivize the desired behavior by other nations (i.e., not shooting at the autonomous ship, unless you want to start a conflict). If every nation adopted this rule, coupled with a “shoot-second posture” for autonomous systems—they would not fire unless fired upon first—the result could be a mutually stable situation. A unilateral declaration of a set of rules for avoiding incidents would be analogous to declaring, “I will drive on the right side of the road. I suggest you do the same or we both will crash.” This could work if countries’ aim is to coordinate their behavior to avoid conflict, meaning they have some shared interests in avoiding accidental escalation.

**2NC—Say yes**

**Diplomacy is possible if the US intentions are not to undermine Russia**

**Haass 5/10** - President, Council on Foreign Relations, Expertise U.S. Foreign Policy International Relations (Richard Haass, “Is Diplomacy Between Russia and the West Still Possible?” Council on Foreign Relations, 5/10/2022, <https://www.cfr.org/article/diplomacy-between-russia-and-west-still-possible)//mcu>

Amid more than two months of intense media focus on the war in Ukraine, one story was largely overlooked. In late April, the United States and Russia carried out an exchange of prisoners. Russia released an American (a former marine) whom it detained some three years ago, while the US released a Russian pilot imprisoned over a decade ago on drug smuggling charges. What makes the exchange noteworthy is that it took place at a time when Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has brought relations with the US to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. The US has opted to avoid direct military involvement in the war, but it is doing a great deal to affect its trajectory, including providing Ukraine with large quantities of increasingly advanced arms, intelligence, and training so that it can successfully resist and potentially defeat the Russian forces. The US has also taken steps to strengthen NATO and impose severe economic sanctions on Russia. The war is likely to stretch on for some time. Although Ukraine’s fundamental interest is to end the war and prevent more death and destruction, President Volodymyr Zelensky’s desire for peace is conditional. He seeks to regain territory that Russia occupies and ensure the country’s sovereignty is respected so that, among other things, Ukraine can join the European Union. He also wants those responsible for war crimes to be held accountable. The World This Week A weekly digest of the latest from CFR on the biggest foreign policy stories of the week, featuring briefs, opinions, and explainers. Every Friday. Email Address View all newsletters > Russian President Vladimir Putin, for his part, needs to achieve an outcome that justifies his costly invasion lest he appear weak and be challenged at home. There is little chance that a peace could be negotiated that would bridge the gap between these two seemingly irreconcilable positions. It is far more likely that the conflict will continue not just for months, but for years to come. This will be the backdrop for US and Western relations with Russia. One possibility for the West would be to link the entire relationship with Russia to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. This would be a mistake, though, because Russia can affect other Western interests, such as limiting the nuclear and missile capabilities of Iran and North Korea, and the success of global efforts to limit the emissions that cause climate change. The good news is that, as the prisoner exchange demonstrates**, profound differences over Ukraine need not preclude conducting mutually useful business if both sides are willing to compartmentalize**. But protecting the possibility of selective cooperation will require sophisticated, disciplined diplomacy. For starters, the US and its partners will need to prioritize and even limit their goals in Ukraine. This means renouncing talk of regime change in Moscow. We need to deal with the Russia we have, not the one we would prefer. Putin’s position may come to be challenged from within (or he may succumb to reported health challenges) but the West is not in a position to engineer his removal, much less ensure that someone better replaces him. Likewise, Western governments would be wise to put off talk of war crimes tribunals for senior Russian officials and stop boasting about helping Ukraine target senior Russian generals and ships. The war and investigations are ongoing, and the Russians need to see some benefit in acting responsibly. The same holds for reparations. Similarly, although Russia will likely find itself worse off economically and militarily as a result of initiating this war of choice, the **US government should make clear that**, contrary to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s remarks, **America’s goal is not to use the war to weaken Russia**. On the contrary, the US should underscore that it wants the war to end as soon as possible on terms that reflect Ukraine’s sovereign, independent status. As for the war in Ukraine, the West should continue to provide support for Ukraine and prevent escalation by avoiding direct combat. The Kremlin, though, should be made to understand that this restraint is premised on its not widening the war to a NATO country or introducing weapons of mass destruction, at which point such self-imposed Western limits would disappear. The West also should consider carefully its war aims and how to pursue them. The goal should be that Ukraine controls all its territory, but this does not necessarily justify trying to liberate Crimea or even all of the eastern Donbas region by military force. Some of these goals might be better sought through diplomacy and selective easing of sanctions. But, until Russia’s behavior changes, sanctions should not just remain in place but be extended to cover energy imports that are funding the Russian war effort. **Diplomacy is a tool of national security to be used, not a favor to be bestowed, and it should continue to be pursued with Russia**. Private meetings between senior civilian and military officials of Western countries and Russia should resume, in order to reduce the risk of a miscalculation that could lead to confrontation or worse, and to explore opportunities for limited cooperation. It may well be that constructive relations with Russia do not emerge until well into a post-Putin era. But this in no way alters the West’s interest in seeing that relations do not fall below a certain floor in the interim.

**Ukraine wheat deal proves Russia is willing to negotiate**

**Hunder 7/22** (Ezgi Erkoyun, Ece Toksabay and Max Hunder, “Ukraine, Russia Sign Black Sea Grain Export Deal” Illinois Farm Policy, July 22, 2022, <https://farmpolicynews.illinois.edu/2022/07/ukraine-russia-sign-black-sea-grain-export-deal/)//mcu>

“The accord crowned **two months of talks brokered by** the United Nations and Turkey, a **NATO** member that has good relations with both Russia and Ukraine and controls the straits leading into the Black Sea.” The Reuters article explained that, “Senior U.N. officials, briefing reporters on Friday, said the deal was expected to be fully operational in a few weeks and would restore grain shipments from the three reopened ports to pre-war levels of 5 million tonnes a month. “Safe passage into and out of the ports would be guaranteed in what one official called a ‘de facto ceasefire‘ for the ships and facilities covered, they said, although the word ‘ceasefire’ was not in the agreement text.

**2NC—AI Subs**

**Code of conduct/hot line solves the whole aff**

**Bajema 7/16** - Dr. Natasha Bajema has held long-term assignments at the National Defense University, in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. She's currently Director of the Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks. (“WILL AI STEAL SUBMARINES’ STEALTH?,” IEEE Spectrum, 16 JUL 2022, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/nuclear-submarine)//mcu>

\*Sylvia Mishra, a new-tech nuclear officer at the European Leadership Network, a London-based think tank

To protect the stealth of submarines, Mishra says, “There is a need for creative thinking. One possibility is exploring a **code of conduct** for the employment of emerging technologies for surveillance missions.” **There are precedents for such cooperation**. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union set up a secure communications system—**a hotline**—to help prevent a misunderstanding from snowballing into a disaster. The two countries also developed a body of rules and procedures, such as never to launch a missile along a potentially threatening trajectory. **Nuclear powers could agree to exercise similar restraint in the detection of submarines**. The stealthy submarine isn’t gone; it still has years of life left. That gives us ample time to find new ways to keep the peace.

**2NC—Signal**

**Even if its not binding, signaling solves**

**Horowitz and Scharre 21** – Horowitz Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American; won the 2017 Karl Deutsch Award given by the International Studies Association for early career contributions to the fields of international relations and peace research; research interests include the intersection of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics with global politics, military innovation, the role of leaders in international politics, and geopolitical forecasting methodology; worked for Department of Defense and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. received his PhD in government from Harvard University and his BA in political science from Emory University. Scharre a Senior Fellow and Director at CNAS; worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense establishing policies on autonomous systems and emerging weapons technologies; holds a PhD in war studies from King’s College London and an MA in political economy and public policy and a BS in physics (Michael Horowitz and Paul Scharre, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” Center for New American Security, January 2021, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures)//mcu>

Nations could agree to a written set of rules or principles for how they adopt AI into military systems. These rules and principles, **even if not legally binding, could nevertheless serve a valuable signaling and coordination function to avoid some of the risks in AI adoption**. A code of conduct, statement of principles, or other agreement could include a wide range of both general and specific statements, including potentially on any or all of the confidence-building measures listed above. Even if countries cannot agree on specific details beyond promoting safe and responsible military use of AI, more general statements could nevertheless be valuable in signaling to other nations some degree of mutual understanding about responsible use of military AI and help create **positive norms** of behavior. Ideally, a code of conduct would have support from a wide range of countries and major military powers. However, if this were not possible, then a multilateral statement of principles from like-minded countries could still have some value in increasing transparency and promulgating norms of responsible state behavior.

**2NC—AT: PDB**

**Increasing nuclear capabilities simultaneously ruins negotiations**

**Bidgood 3/15** - director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies. (Sarah Bidgood, “A New Nuclear Arms Race Is a Real Possibility,” Foreign Policy, 3/15/2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/15/nuclear-arms-control-race-russia-ukraine-america/)//mcu

Although this reaction is not unexpected, **the Strategic Stability Dialogue process should be resumed as soon as it is feasible to do so**. Not only could it provide a valuable forum for communication during this crisis, but **the longer it remains on hiatus, the more difficult it will become**—politically and bureaucratically—to return. Further, if domestic stakeholders in either country conclude from this crisis that more nuclear weapons are needed to serve their national security interests, this process will have little chance of yielding meaningful results. If it fails, this will have serious implications for an already impoverished arms control architecture, the last vestige of which will expire in 2026.

**US concessions make Russian cooperation more likely**

Eugene **Rumer and** Richard **Sokolsky 19**, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, 6-20-19, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?” <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/20/thirty-years-of-u.s.-policy-toward-russia-can-vicious-circle-be-broken-pub-79323>, jy

A military confrontation between the two countries could have profoundly **destabilizing** and even **catastrophic effects on global order** and security. In contrast, a more cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship could yield progress on threats to U.S. national security and prosperity—challenges that the United States **cannot tackle effectively alone**. Preventing further **nuclear proliferation**, including the complex problem of securing nuclear materials and other components of **weapons of mass destruction**, will require not only greater U.S.-Russia collaboration but also preserving at least some elements of the remaining **arms control framework** and **inspection regimes**. Efforts to combat transnational threats, from **terrorist movements** to **criminal organizations** and **illicit trafficking**, would also benefit from U.S.-Russian cooperation. Likewise, it will not be possible to resolve **long-standing regional conflicts**, for example on the **Korean Peninsula** and in **Afghanistan**, **Syria**, and **Ukraine**, without U.S. and Russian cooperation and **willingness to negotiate**. Finally, the United States and Russia will need to find practical ways to avoid **escalation of tensions in cyberspace** and **outer space**, and **restrain the growth of Chinese influence**.

POST–COLD WAR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS—WHAT WENT WRONG?

U.S. policy toward Russia since the end of the Cold War is a story of different administrations pursuing essentially the same set of policies. Two aspects stand out as **major irritants** in the bilateral relationship: a refusal to accept Russia **as it is,** as evidenced by repeated initiatives to reform and remake its political system; and the **extension of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture** into the Eurasian space surrounding Russia. Both of these highly ambitious pursuits have been attempted **repeatedly and unsuccessfully**, yet both continue to be **cornerstones of official U.S. policy toward Russia**. In retrospect, it is hard to escape the conclusion that a less ambitious U.S. approach to dealing with Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union could have established a **better basis** for a less rocky U.S.-Russian relationship.

BOOM TO BUST

Addressing a joint session of Congress in January 1991, then president George H. W. Bush spoke about his desire “to continue to build a lasting basis” for cooperation with Russia.6 His wish, no doubt sincere, was expressed at a time of widely held hopes that the Cold War was ending and the two superpowers would put their differences aside and begin collaborating on the world’s many problems “for a more peaceful future for all mankind.”7

It was indeed a promising phase in relations between Washington and Moscow, full of significant accomplishments and optimism about the future. In a short period of time, the two Cold War adversaries negotiated a treaty to reduce strategic nuclear weapons (START II), signed a multilateral treaty on conventional forces in Europe, negotiated the terms for German reunification and a unified Germany’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and agreed on a charter for European security and stability after the Cold War. Moreover, their cooperation was not confined to Europe; they also jointly sponsored a major conference in Madrid on the Middle East and successfully dealt with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s aggression against Kuwait. Most important, they entered into all of these endeavors with a new spirit of U.S.-Russian partnership, a far cry from the threatening rhetoric and tensions that had been a hallmark of their relationship for more than a generation.

For the three decades that followed, the U.S.-Russian relationship went through a series of boom-bust cycles, reaching its nadir after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Through the Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations, U.S. policy toward Russia followed a familiar pattern. First, a new presidential administration comes into the White House deeply dissatisfied with the state of the U.S.-Russia relationship. It commits to do better and launches a policy review that generates a new approach—a “reset”—toward Russia aimed at developing a partnership. The road toward partnership looks promising, but obstacles gradually begin to emerge and eventually escalate into a full-blown crisis. By the end of the administration’s time in office, the relationship is at the lowest point since the Cold War.

Thus, the spirit of partnership that marked the end of the Cold War did not last long. The elder Bush’s hope for a new relationship with Russia in a new world order ran into the harsh reality of the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union and the chaos that engulfed Russia less than a year after his speech. The Bush administration had little chance to prepare for such a dramatic turn of events and develop a policy commensurate with the magnitude of the change in Russia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Consumed by domestic economic and political crises, Russia largely retreated from the world stage and for the most part was rendered largely incapable of acting as a partner to the United States as envisioned by Bush. Demoralized and embittered Russian elites soon constructed a narrative—greatly amplified by the Kremlin throughout Vladimir Putin’s presidency—that the United States had taken advantage of their country at a moment of weakness, which created a sense of victimhood and soured the overall atmosphere in U.S.-Russian relations.

The Clinton administration, frustrated with what it saw as its predecessor’s insufficiently robust engagement to support reforms in Russia, declared its intent in 1993 to build “the foundation for a new democratic partnership between the United States and Russia.”8 Speaking in Vancouver, Canada, in April 1993, at the first of his many summits with Russia’s then president Boris Yeltsin, Clinton promised:

Mr. President, our nation will not stand on the sidelines when it comes to democracy and Russia. We know where we stand. We are with Russian democracy, we are with Russian reforms, we are with Russian markets. We support freedom of conscience and speech and religion. We support respect for ethnic minorities. We actively support reform and reformers and you in Russia.9

Soon after these hopeful words were spoken, the relationship encountered its first bumps. In late September and early October 1993, tensions between the Russian executive and legislative branches came to a head in a bloody confrontation in Moscow, as the constitutional crisis between Yeltsin and his rebellious parliament led to violence in the streets. When the dust settled, Yeltsin had managed to push through a new constitution that consolidated executive power to such an extent that in effect it placed the presidency above all other branches of government. That same autumn, Russian officials expressed their strong **opposition to NATO enlargement**1, which was emerging as the **principal pillar of U.S. policy** in Europe.0

**Russia Strategic Stability DA**

**1NC—Strategic Prolif**

**Ukraine has drastically slowed Russia’s nuclear modernization**

**Korda 6/14** - Senior Research Associate and Project Manager for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists; worked for the Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre at NATO HQ in Brussels. (Matt Korda, “How Russia’s war in Ukraine could derail its nuclear modernization,” Outrider, 6/14/22, <https://outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/articles/how-russias-war-ukraine-could-derail-its-nuclear-modernization)//mcu>

In recent weeks, a fair amount of speculative ink has been spilled about the prospect of Vladimir Putin using nuclear weapons to achieve his war aims in Ukraine. Thankfully, despite Putin’s overt nuclear signaling, the conflict remains well below the nuclear threshold. However, this doesn’t mean that Putin’s war in Ukraine won’t have potentially profound long-term consequences for Russia’s nuclear arsenal––specifically**, its ability to complete its modernization** program on time in the face of overwhelming sanctions. Russia is in the midst of a decades-long nuclear modernization campaign to replace all of its Soviet-era weapons with new systems by the mid-2020s. This modernization is the top priority for both Russia’s military and for Putin. In his annual end-of-year speech in 2020, Putin underscored the importance of keeping pace with Russia’s nuclear competitors: “It is absolutely unacceptable to stand idle. The pace of change in all areas that are critical for the Armed Forces is unusually fast today. It is not even Formula 1 fast – it is supersonic fast. You stop for one second, and you start falling behind immediately.” Despite Putin’s stated emphasis on speedy nuclear modernization, several big-ticket systems have been **plagued by multi-year delays** and––in some cases––**abrupt cancellations**. These chronic delays have affected some of the most highly anticipated delivery systems in Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Russia’s new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was supposed to be operational by 2018 but wasn’t even flight tested until April 2022. Additionally, in 2018, Russia also postponed the Rubezh ICBM––originally intended to be one of the primary carriers for Russia’s Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle––and canceled the development of a rail-based ICBM known as Barguzin. The development of both Russia’s new Borei ballistic missile submarines and their Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) were delayed by several years, along with the development of the next-generation PAK-DA strategic bomber. All this is to say, Russia’s nuclear modernization hasn’t exactly been “Formula 1 fast.”

**Any perception of increased ocean transparency destroys strategic stability, begins a nuclear arms race**

**Bajema 7/16** - Dr. Natasha Bajema has held long-term assignments at the National Defense University, in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. She's currently Director of the Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks. (“WILL AI STEAL SUBMARINES’ STEALTH?,” IEEE Spectrum, 16 JUL 2022, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/nuclear-submarine)//mcu>

**Nuclear deterrence depends on the ability of submarines to hide** For some years to come, the vastness of the ocean will continue to protect the stealth of submarines. But the very prospect of greater ocean transparency has implications for **global security**. Concealed submarines bearing ballistic missiles provide the threat of retaliation against a first nuclear strike. What if that changes? “We take for granted the degree to which we rely upon having a significant portion of our forces exist in an essentially invulnerable position,” Lewis says. Even if new developments did not reduce submarine stealth by much, **the mere perception** of such a reduction could **undermine strategic stability.** A gray unmanned helicopter, notably lacking a cockpit or any kind of window, is shown hovering against a clear, blue sky. It carries a downward-poinging sensor under its nose. A Northrop Grumman MQ-8C, an uncrewed helicopter, has recently been deployed by the U.S. Navy in the Indo-Pacific area for use in surveillance. In the future, it will also be used for antisubmarine operations. NORTHROP GRUMMAN Gottemoeller warns that “**any perception** that nuclear-armed submarines have become more targetable will lead to questions about the survivability of second-strike forces. Consequently, countries are going to do everything they can to counter any such vulnerability.” Experts disagree on the irreversibility of ocean transparency. Because any technological breakthroughs will not be implemented overnight, “nations should have ample time to develop countermeasures [that] cancel out any improved detection capabilities,” says Matt Korda, senior research associate at the Federation of American Scientists, in Washington, D.C. However, Roger Bradbury and eight colleagues at the National Security College of the Australian National University disagree, claiming that any technical ability to counter detection technologies will start to decline by 2050. Korda also points out that ocean transparency, to the extent that it occurs, “will not affect countries equally. And that raises some interesting questions.” For example, U.S. nuclear-powered submarines are “the quietest on the planet. They are virtually undetectable. Even if submarines become more visible in general, this may have zero meaningful effect on U.S. submarines’ survivability.” Sylvia Mishra, a new-tech nuclear officer at the European Leadership Network, a London-based think tank, says she is “more concerned about the overall problem of ambiguity under the sea.” Until recently, she says, movement under the oceans was the purview of governments. Now, though, there’s a growing industry presence under the sea. For example, companies are laying many underwater fiber-optic communication cables, Mishra says, “which may lead to greater congestion of underwater inspection vehicles, and the possibility for confusion.” A large, cylindrical vehicle is shown just as it has been lowered below the surface of the water, suspended by two green cables. A Snakehead, a large underwater drone designed to be launched and recovered by U.S. Navy nuclear-powered submarines, is shown at its christening ceremony in Narragansett Bay in Newport, R.I.U.S. NAVY Confusion might come from the fact that drones, unlike surface ships, do not bear a country flag, and therefore their ownership may be unclear. This uncertainty, coupled with the possibility that the drones could also carry lethal payloads, increases the risk that a naval force might view an innocuous commercial drone as hostile. “Any actions that hold the strategic assets of adversaries at risk may produce new touch points for conflict and exacerbate the risk of war,” says Mishra. Given the strategic importance of submarine stealth, Gower asks, “Why would any country want to detect and track submarines? **It’s only something you’d do if you want to make a nuclear-armed power nervous**.” Even in the Cold War, when the United States and the U.K. routinely tracked Soviet ballistic-missile submarines**, they did so only because they knew their activities would go undetected**—that is, **without risking escalation**. Gower postulates that this was dangerously arrogant: “**To actively track second-strike nuclear forces is about as escalatory as you might imagine**.” “All nuclear-armed states place a great value on their second-strike forces,” Gottemoeller says. If greater ocean transparency produces new risks to their survivability, **real or perceived**, she says, countries may respond in two ways: build up their nuclear forces further and take new measures to protect and defend them, **producing a new arms race**; or else keep the number of nuclear weapons limited and find other ways to bolster their viability.

**Nuclear war**

Stephanie **Pezard &** Ashley L. **Rhoades 20**. \*Senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Former researcher with the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey think-tank. Former visiting scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. \*\*Defense analyst at the RAND Corporation; serves as the special projects coordinator for RAND's Center for Middle East Public Policy. "What Provokes Putin's Russia? Deterring Without Unintended Escalation". RAND Corporation2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE338.html?utm\_campaign=

Although the risk of **nuclear war** between the United States and Russia may not appear to be as much of a threat as it was during the Cold War, it is still a **looming** possibility. As a matter of doctrine, Russia has articulated its **willingness** to **use nuclear weapons** in response to anything it deems to be an existential threat, stating,

The Russian Federation shall reserve for itself the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the use against it and/or its allies of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with use of conventional weapons when the state’s very existence has been threatened.86

Against the backdrop of Russia’s violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the U.S. announcement that it would walk away from that treaty, as well as the earlier U.S. 2002 withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Russia’s **strategic enhancements** to its nuclear forces—including changes to its intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles—appear **particularly problematic**.87

In this context, any changes or perceived changes in U.S. and NATO **nuclear forces**—such as the recent placement of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe and discussion of increasing nuclear force posture—serve to **further jeopardize strategic stability** with Russia.88 Putin has expressed a great deal of concern about U.S. nuclear force developments, which he sees as being targeted at Russia despite U.S. assertions that the focus of its nuclear deterrence is on threats from Iran and North Korea.89 Thus far, nuclear deterrence has largely rested on the strategic stability enabled by the **relative parity** between U.S. and Russian nuclear forces. Any shifts in this balance, coupled with the Russian belief that the United States intends to launch a nuclear attack, may spark Russian fears that it will **lose** its **second-strike** capability, increasing its incentive to **strike first**.90 In a classic security dilemma scenario, U.S. and NATO attempts to **strengthen** their **defensive capabilities**, particularly in the nuclear realm, may **inadvertently appear** to be **offensive**—and therefore threatening—behavior and trigger the outbreak of **conventional** or even **nuclear war**.91 Given Russia’s expressed willingness to use nuclear weapons and Putin’s tendency to interpret any U.S. nuclear force developments as offensive, the United States should be careful to avoid **inadvertently provoking a nuclear response** from Russia while attempting to deter this exact behavior. Risks of **Russian nuclear escalation** might also be prompted by major changes in the balance of **conventional forces**. From this perspective, the ultimate risk associated with enhancing **any form** of U.S. or NATO **military capabilities** is that Russia may feel that it has to respond with a **nuclear attack** if it is unable to **match** U.S. and NATO combined conventional military strength. Therefore, enhancing and expanding capabilities, **even if** they are **defensive** in nature, may create such a **strong perception of threat** for Russia that it could prompt a **preemptive nuclear attack**.92

**2NC—U**

**Nuclear modernization is slow, took over 20 years for Sarmat**

**Harddie et al 4/28** (Anthony Ruggiero, Bradley Bowman and John Hardie, “Russia’s Sarmat test underscores need to modernize US nuclear triad” Defense News, 4/28/2022, <https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2022/04/28/russias-sarmat-test-underscores-need-to-modernize-us-nuclear-triad/)//mcu>

Russia conducted its first flight test of the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile on April 20. The launch represents a notable milestone in Russia’s ongoing nuclear modernization designed to hold the American homeland at risk, underscoring the importance of modernizing the U.S. nuclear triad and associated nuclear command, control and communications system. Russia’s Defence Ministry announced the Sarmat “was successfully test-launched from a silo at the Plesetsk state testing cosmodrome” in northwestern Russia. The test “confirmed” the missile’s “design characteristics” during “all phases of its flight,” the ministry declared, adding that its “practice warheads arrived at the designated area at the Kura proving ground on the Kamchatka Peninsula.” Although Russia has conducted three Sarmat ejection tests since December 2017, this latest test was the missile’s first flight test. The Sarmat is a three-stage, silo-based, liquid-fuel, heavy ICBM with a reported range of 18,000 kilometers. Dubbed “Satan II” by NATO, the missile is a Russian-built replacement of the Soviet-era SS-18 “Satan” ICBM, which is reaching the end of its life cycle. The Sarmat reportedly can carry a 10-ton payload consisting of 10-plus multiple independent reentry vehicles along with penetration aids used to evade missile defenses. Moscow says the new missile can also carry several Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles. The **Sarmat has reportedly been under development since the 2000s** but gained notoriety after being publicly touted during a March 2018 address by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The Russian leader boasted that the Sarmat would be impervious to existing or potential missile defenses thanks to its short boost phase and extremely long range, which would allow the missile to travel over the North or South poles. Missiles are often their most vulnerable during the boost phase, and most American missile sensors normally focus on threats traveling over the North Pole rather than the South Pole. Regardless, existing U.S. missile defense capabilities are focused on rogue states such as North Korea and stand no chance of defending against a massive Russian nuclear attack against the American homeland, reinforcing the need for a robust and reliable U.S. nuclear deterrent. Moscow claims serial production of the Sarmat will commence this fall, and that the missile will begin combat duty with Russia’s 62nd Missile Division in Uzhur, Krasnoyarsk Krai, before year’s end, although that timeline is likely unrealistic. The test itself was “routine” and “not a surprise,” as Pentagon press secretary John Kirby noted. Indeed, Sarmat’s **flight tests have been delayed for years, making this test long overdue.** That, however, did not stop Putin from calling the test a “momentous event,” vowing the missile “will be a wakeup call for those who are trying to threaten” Russia. That provocative language follows several instances of nuclear saber-rattling by Putin both before and after Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s behavior stands in stark contrast with the Biden administration’s decision to postpone and then cancel a March 3 launch of an unarmed Minuteman III ICBM. The administration had already notified Russia and provided a notification for civilian air traffic. Kirby attempted to justify the postponement as an effort to ensure U.S. actions were not “misunderstood or misconstrued,” saying the decision demonstrated Washington is “a responsible nuclear power.” Putin, however, may interpret such concessions by Washington as weakness and an indication that his nuclear saber-rattling is working. Asked about the Minuteman III test during a March hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Adm. Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, recommended “that we maintain our normal set of operations.” Richard emphasized he needs these tests to “maintain confidence and reliability” in the 50-year-old Minuteman III, which faces growing reliability concerns as it nears the end of its service life. Another test is slated for later this year, which the administration should conduct as planned. That will remind Putin that the United States has the means to respond to a nuclear attack. More broadly, the Sarmat test — not to mention China’s rapid nuclear expansion — underscores the need to modernize America’s own nuclear triad, including by urgently replacing the Minuteman III with the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, otherwise known as the LGM-35A Sentinel.

**Russian military modernization has been halted by the war in Ukraine – sanctions prevent development of advanced weapons because they rely on foreign microelectronics.**

**Detsch ‘5-25 –** Jack, Pentagon and National Security reporter @ Foreign Policy, (“Pentagon Deputy: Russia’s Defense Industry ‘Will Feel’ Pain of Ukraine War”, 5/25/22, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/25/pentagon-russia-defense-industry-ukraine-war/>) – sel

U.S. and international economic sanctions and export controls are likely to significantly **hamper** Russia’s ability to produce **advanced fighter jets**, **naval platforms**, and **space capabilities** essential to the Kremlin’s efforts to modernize its military, the U.S. Defense Department’s No. 2 official said. The Pentagon and Western governments have indicated for weeks that Russia is struggling to restock precision-guided munitions that use foreign-made computer chips and guidance systems to help them hit targets, which has an immediate impact on Russia’s war in Ukraine. But U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks, who is in Europe on her first international trip after a year on the job, told reporters on Tuesday that the Kremlin’s deep reliance on foreign-produced microelectronics that are now under harsh economic controls is expected to hamper a much wider range of platforms. “The economic costs of Putin’s decision to undertake this war are going to be significant for Russia, and Russia’s defense industry will feel that,” Hicks told reporters during a press conference at U.S. European Command headquarters, where she traveled to visit U.S. and European troops helping to oversee the transit of military aid to Ukraine. “I do anticipate you’ll see that across the breadth of their major modernization areas.” “Whether it’s advanced fighter aircraft, whether it’s in their advanced munitions, whether it’s in their naval platforms, **microelectronics are central**,” Hicks added. Russia’s current military modernization plan, set to conclude in 2027, is focused on backing up the Kremlin’s ground forces with a bevy of long-range weapons systems that could hold NATO nations at bay, including two varieties of **hypersonic missiles**, sea- and air-launched Kalibr **cruise missiles**, and short- and intermediate-range **Iskander missiles**—all of which have been used in combat in Ukraine. A senior U.S. defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity based on ground rules set by the Pentagon, said Russia has aimed to perfect **“non-contact”** warfare against the NATO alliance, using standoff strikes if it were to come to blows with European nations in a wider regional war—areas of military modernization where Russia could now face significant headwinds. But even before Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, eight years of fighting in the country’s Donbas region had helped sever vital links with Ukrainian aerospace industries and shipbuilders, delaying the rollout of new ships and submarines and forcing the Kremlin to turn to Soviet-era designs for some aircraft. Dating back to the 2002 U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Putin has sought to concentrate the Kremlin’s focus on developing the nuclear triad and emerging technologies, highlighted by six novel nuclear weapons systems unveiled in 2018 that are not covered by arms control treaties. And Russia has long struggled to get its fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 fighter jet program running, with just **four** aircraft entering service since the program was inaugurated in 2020. The modern fighter was missing in action during Russia’s “Victory Day” parade in Moscow at the beginning of the month, and three months into the war, Russian forces still have not achieved air superiority. The microelectronics that Russia is struggling to get ahold of “form the **backbone** of modern military capabilities,” said Jesse Salazar, who was the Pentagon’s top official for industrial policy until earlier this year. He said the coronavirus pandemic has also **stressed** the defense industry, forcing some product lead times from six months to two years with digitization moving forward rapidly. “The sanctions on Russia will likely exacerbate this supply chain challenge and make production of advanced technology systems much harder and longer, especially in defense,” he said. The senior U.S. defense official said Russia’s game plan for a wider regional war, known as “active defense,” envisions using preemptive strikes to bloody the nose of NATO forces and deter them from attack. U.S. officials are still trying to understand how Russian military aspirations to field high-grade weapons compare with their actual capabilities on the battlefield, where Russian forces have struggled to ensure basic logistics and have incurred disastrous troop losses in just a few months of fighting. The economic impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine is also taxing the Kremlin’s weapons sales abroad, officials said. Russia is responsible for about a fifth of [global arms sales](https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46937) around the world since 2016, including to India, which the United States has been trying to dissuade from buying Russian weapons. “What we’re seeing is a significant challenge for them on arms sales because of all the economic effects that they’re experiencing from their decision to pursue this war in Ukraine,” said Hicks, the Pentagon’s No. 2 official. She called arms sales one of Russia’s “major levers” of influence in Africa. Russia has increasingly sought to try to insulate itself from international supply chains, boosting state spending to fund the electronics industry by 800 percent in 2021 alone. “This was likely to have been used to finance the development of electronics to replace those banned by Western sanctions imposed in 2014,” wrote Richard Connolly, an expert on the Russian economy who leads the Eastern Advisory Group consultancy, in a recent report commissioned by the Pentagon. Connolly said Chinese firms could also help Russia with the production of components and with designs for advanced missiles. Russian pilots have already struggled to navigate the skies over the battlefield, and their obstacles go beyond just Ukraine’s air defenses. In a speech this month, British defense secretary [Ben Wallace](https://nixolympia.com/ben-wallace-russian-pilots-are-taping-basic-gps-devices-to-their-dashboards-in-ukraine/) said crashed Russian SU-34 jets in Ukraine had been found with GPS receivers taped to their instrument panels “so that the pilots knew where they were because of the poor quality of their own systems.” Experts expect that semiconductor and computer chip sanctions will force the Kremlin to put more **Soviet-era** equipment onto the battlefield. (Russia is reportedly preparing to deploy old T-62 tanks, first deployed in the early 1960s, to the fight in Ukraine due to ongoing losses of more advanced equipment.) “They’ll not lack for basic platforms in storage that they can bring into use to replace losses, but advanced navigation, sighting, stabilization, and weapon seeker components won’t be available due to sanctions, so the quality will be lower,” said Justin Bronk, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London focused on air power and technology. “They’ll struggle to produce modern cockpit displays, navigation equipment, radars, and weapon seekers for their combat aircraft.”

**2NC—L**

**U.S sub detection capabilities cause Russian prolif, and destabilizing escalation scenarios**

**Kattan 21** [Ari Kattan, Ari Kattan is a policy analyst at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), where he supports the DefenseScience Board. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of SAIC or itsgovernment clients., 08-15-2021, accessed on 7-2-2022, Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Emerging Submarine Detection Technologies and Implications for Strategic Stability", <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22545.9?seq=1> mimou]

The U.S.-Russia relationship is defined by Russian fear of its own weaknesses (economic, technological, etc.) and paranoia about U.S. and NATO threats to its security. Russia currently fears U.S. conventional superiority20 and has invested in capabilities and tactics to circumvent it.21 It is embarking on a modernization program for its nuclear weapons in part because it **feels insecure about the survivability of its nuclear forces** as the United States increases its progress on ballistic missile defense. If the **U**nited **S**tates were able to **track Russian** nuclear-armed **submarines** with increased confidence, it could **exacerbate these Russian fears** even more, causing Russia to **respond in destabilizing ways**. While it is true that Russia has never relied as much on submarine-based weapons as the United States has, the degradation of the survivability of Russia’s nuclear-armed submarines would likely cause Russia to compensate for this new vulnerability. This is especially true if continued advancements in precision strike make Russia’s air- and land-based nuclear forces more vulnerable. If Russia can no longer rely on hardening and concealment for survivability, they may double down on redundancy, producing and **deploying larger numbers** of **nuclear** **weapons** to complicate U.S. targeting and increase the odds that a retaliatory capability survives any U.S. first strike. This, in turn, could put the final **nail in the coffin of arms control** and lead to an **arms race** with the United States that drains resources, intensifies **mistrust**, and makes **miscalculation** more **likely**. In short, a significant U.S. advantage in submarine detection (which would likely develop in parallel with a U.S. advantage in remote sensing and precision strike capabilities in other domains) would likely be **destabilizing** due to **Russian sensitivity** **over** its **technological inferiority**. This could compel Russia not only to increase redundancy with a larger number of warheads, but to change the doctrine governing their use as well. It is possible that in an environment of degraded second-strike stability, Russia could move further towards a first-use doctrine to deter escalation and to avoid the “lose them or lose them” dilemma. China would likely be less sensitive to advancements in U.S. submarine detection capabilities for two reasons. First, China’s strategic relationship with the United States, at least currently, is not defined by an assumed need for parity but by a need for a minimum reprisal capability, which it believes it has and will continue to have in the future.22 It currently has a much smaller nuclear arsenal than the United States and relies on hardened and road-mobile land-based ICBMs for its retaliatory capability, which it believes is sufficient as long as it can hit the United States with just a few nuclear warheads, or even a single nuclear warhead.23 Second, China has not historically relied on SSBNs for its second-strike capability, and even as it begins deploying a credible sea-based nuclear deterrent for the first time,24 it recognizes that its submarines are less advanced and thus more vulnerable to ASW than U.S. submarines. Therefore, China will likely continue to rely on land-based nuclear forces.25 The remote sensing and precision strike revolution will certainly have implications for U.S.-China relations, but in the narrow hypothetical of U.S. superiority in submarine detection, **China** would be less concerned than Russia. They may, however, be sufficiently concerned that they decide to **expand** the size of **their** **arsenal** as a hedge. Overall, conditions under which the United States had a significant advantage in submarine detection could push some adversaries away from an assured retaliation nuclear posture and towards what Vipin Narang calls an **asymmetric escalation nuclear posture.**26 An asymmetric escalation nuclear posture entails **threatening to use nuclear weapons first** in a conflict to deter conflict and to prevent successful counterforce targeting by an adversary. If nations currently predisposed towards adopting assured retaliation postures no longer feel that the second-strike forces necessary for such a posture are secure, they may be forced to adopt asymmetric escalation postures.

**AI kills submarine stealth**

**Bajema 7/16** - Dr. Natasha Bajema has held long-term assignments at the National Defense University, in the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, and at the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. She's currently Director of the Converging Risks Lab at the Council on Strategic Risks. (“WILL AI STEAL SUBMARINES’ STEALTH?,” IEEE Spectrum, 16 JUL 2022, <https://spectrum.ieee.org/nuclear-submarine)//mcu>

SUBMARINES ARE VALUED primarily for their ability to hide. The assurance that submarines would likely survive the first missile strike in a nuclear war and thus be able to respond by launching missiles in a second strike is key to the strategy of deterrence known as mutually assured destruction. **Any new technology that might render the oceans effectively transparent, making it trivial to spot lurking submarines, could thus undermine the peace of the world**. For nearly a century, naval engineers have striven to develop ever-faster, ever-quieter submarines. But they have worked just as hard at advancing a wide array of radar, sonar, and other technologies designed to detect, target, and eliminate enemy submarines. The balance seemed to turn with the emergence of nuclear-powered submarines in the early 1960s. In a 2015 study for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, Bryan Clark, a naval specialist now at the Hudson Institute, noted that the ability of these boats to remain submerged for long periods of time made them “nearly impossible to find with radar and active sonar.” But even these stealthy submarines produce subtle, very-low-frequency noises that can be picked up from far away by networks of acoustic hydrophone arrays mounted to the seafloor. And now the game of submarine hide-and-seek may be approaching the point at which submarines can no longer elude detection and simply disappear. It may come as early as 2050, according to a recent study by the National Security College of the Australian National University, in Canberra. This timing is particularly significant because the enormous costs required to design and build a submarine are meant to be spread out over at least 60 years. A submarine that goes into service today should still be in service in 2082. Nuclear-powered submarines, such as the Virginia-class fast-attack submarine, each cost roughly US $2.8 billion, according to the U.S. Congressional Budget Office. And that’s just the purchase price; the total life cycle cost for the new Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarine is estimated to exceed $395 billion. The twin problems of detecting submarines of rival countries and protecting one’s own submarines from detection are enormous, and the technical details are closely guarded secrets. Many naval experts are speculating about sensing technologies that could be used in concert with **modern AI** methodologies to neutralize a submarine’s stealth. Rose Gottemoeller, former deputy secretary general of NATO, warns that “the stealth of submarines will be difficult to sustain, as sensing of all kinds, in multiple spectra, in and out of the water becomes more ubiquitous.” And the ongoing contest between stealth and detection is becoming increasingly volatile as these new technologies threaten to overturn the balance.

**2NC—Impact**

**Prolif is likely, easy, and causes nuke war**

**Mohilay 22 —** Mudit Mohilay is a marketing professional. Mohilay, Mudit. 3-8-2022, https://www.cnbctv18.com/world/view--why-we-are-closer-to-nuclear-war-than-any-time-except-cuban-missile-crisis-12745512.htm, accessed 7-25-2022, WMK

This is not to say that the NPT is a complete failure. The world had tens of thousands of nuclear weapons during the cold war era, and that number has been significantly brought down. NPT was also successful in keeping a check on the states that successfully developed nuclear capabilities. **However**, despite an undertaking in 2000 to eliminate nuclear arsenals from the planet, existing **nuclear powers continue upgrading their existing arsenals** at the cost of hundreds of billions of dollars.

Events like the Russia-Ukraine war and the resultant perceived helplessness and erosion of trust in global organisations like the UN and international accords like the Budapest Memorandum could potentially cause a **renewed surge of interest in the development of nuclear capabilities** as the ultimate deterrent against invasion and guarantor of sovereignty. However, building and implementing a comprehensive control and command program is **significantly more difficult** than building the actual weapon, and spurred nuclear proliferation especially in developing **countries could exponentially increase the risk of a catastrophic, nuclear event**, accidental or deliberate.

**That causes global nuclear war.**

Daryl G. **Kimball 20**. Executive director of the Arms Control Association. Former executive director of the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers. Former director of security programs for Physicians for Social Responsibility. "No One Wins an Arms Race or a Nuclear War". Arms Control Association. March 2020. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-03/focus/one-wins-arms-race-nuclear-war

The move comes as the administration is proposing to increase spending to more than $44 billion next year to continue and, in some cases, accelerate programs to replace and upgrade all the major elements of the bloated U.S. arsenal. Unless curtailed, the plan, which departs in important ways from long-standing U.S. policies, will accelerate global nuclear competition and increase the risk of **nuclear war**.

As if to underscore the dangers of the administration’s strategy, the Defense Department led an exercise last month simulating a limited nuclear war. “The scenario included a European contingency…. Russia decides to use a **low-yield**, **limited nuclear weapon** against a site on **NATO** territory,” and the United States fires back with a “**limited” nuclear response**, according to the Pentagon. The U.S. response presumably involved the low-yield sub-launched warhead, known as the W76-2.

The exercise perpetuates the dangerous illusion that a nuclear war can be fought and won. The new warhead, which packs a five-kiloton explosive yield, is large enough destroy a large city. It would be delivered on the same type of long-range ballistic missile launched from the same strategic submarine that carries missiles loaded with 100-kiloton strategic warheads. Russian military leaders would be **hard pressed** to know, in the **heat of** a **crisis**, whether the missile was part of a “**limited” strike** or the first wave of an **all-out** nuclear **attack**.

Nevertheless, Trump officials insist that the president needs “more credible” nuclear use options to deter the possible first use of nuclear weapons by Russia. In reality, once nuclear weapons of any kind are detonated in a conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries, there is **no guarantee** against a **cycle of escalation** leading to all-out **global nuclear war**. Lowering the threshold for nuclear use by making nuclear weapons “more usable” takes the United States and Russia and the world in the wrong direction.

**Impact defense**

**1NC – Iran**

**Oil tanker attacks thump UQ**

[Aziz El **Yaakoubi**](https://www.reuters.com/journalists/aziz-el-yaakoubi) **19**, Reuters correspondent covering the Arabian Peninsula as seen in  [Reuters](https://muckrack.com/media-outlet/reuters),  [The New York Times](https://muckrack.com/media-outlet/the-new-york-times), [Business Insider](https://muckrack.com/media-outlet/bizinsider), and [HuffPost](https://muckrack.com/media-outlet/huffpost), 6/19/19, “U.S. Navy says mine fragments, magnet point to Iran in Gulf tanker attack”, *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-attacks-navy/u-s-navy-says-mine-fragments-magnet-point-to-iran-in-gulf-tanker-attack-idUKKCN1TK1C3>, JH

FUJAIRAH, United Arab Emirates (Reuters) - **The United States Navy on Wednesday displayed limpet mine fragments** and a magnet it said it had **removed from one of two oil tankers attacked in the Gulf** of Oman last week, saying the mines bore a striking resemblance to Iranian ones.

Members of the crew of Japanese-owned Kokuka Courageous tanker are seen off the coast of Fujairah, United Arab Emirates June 19, 2019. REUTERS/Abdel Hadi Ramahi

**The United States, waging a “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign against Iran to curb its nuclear and regional activities**, has been trying to build an international consensus that Iran was behind last week’s blasts, as well as a May 12 strike on four oil tankers off the United Arab Emirates.

**Tehran has denied any involvement** in both attacks near the Strait of Hormuz, a major transit route for global oil supplies, but the incidents have raised fears of broader confrontation in the Gulf region.

**The U.S. military previously released images it said showed Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) removing an unexploded limpet mine** from the Japanese-owned tanker Kokuka Courageous, which was hit by explosions along with the Norwegian-owned Front Altair ship on June 13.

“The limpet mine that was used in the attack is distinguishable and al**so strikingly bearing a resemblance to Iranian mines that have already been publicly displayed** in Iranian military parades,” said Commander Sean Kido, commanding officer of an explosive ordinance dive and salvage task group in the Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT).

He was speaking to reporters at a NAVCENT facility near the UAE port of Fujairah. Small fragments said to have been removed from the Kokuka Courageous were on display alongside a magnet purportedly left by the IRCG team allegedly captured on video.

**Iran won’t close the gulf, but even that won’t stop trade**

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In my view, [Iran would certainly have trouble](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/oceans/2007-05-01/smooth-sailingthe-worlds-shipping-lanes-are-safe) stopping all shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. **Modern cargo vessels are massive and difficult to disable**. Unlike in the 1980s, most oil tankers now have double hulls, making them harder to sink. Furthermore, earlier this year the U.S. assembled [a multinational coalition](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/01/02/how-america-and-its-allies-are-keeping-tabs-on-iran-at-sea) to monitor and respond to threats to commercial shipping in the strait.

**Iran will also be wary of the impact that closing the Strait of Hormuz could have on its relations with important economic partners**, such as China. It is estimated that [76% of crude oil passing through the waterway is destined for Asian markets](https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=39932), with China, India, Japan, South Korea and Singapore among the largest markets.

In the past [both the U.S. and Iran](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/watch-defense-secretary-nominee-says-u-s-should-pursue-diplomacy-with-iran) have pivoted back to [diplomatic solutions](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-usa-zarif/iran-floats-offer-on-nuclear-inspections-us-skeptical-idUSKCN1UD310) when tensions have become too high, suggesting that neither side wants to see the conflict escalate from hybrid warfare into a full-blown war.

**1NC – Trade**

**Ukraine and Belarus solve mines in the squo**

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ISTANBUL — **Turkey and Romania have scrambled in recent days to neutralize potentially explosive mines** amid concerns that the weapons may be drifting across the Black Sea from Ukraine’s shores toward neighboring countries.

Defense ministries for both countries, in separate announcements Monday, said they had dispatched their naval forces to defuse mines of unknown origin that appeared near their coasts.

**A mine that appeared Monday was the second reported in the waters near Turkey** in three days. Turkey’s government had said previously that it was in contact with both Moscow and Kyiv about the weapons, but did not specify which side, if either, was responsible for the mines.

Bulgaria’s government last week warned people living in three districts near its Black Sea coast to beware of possible drifting mines, according to [local media reports](https://www.novinite.com/articles/214374/Bulgarian+Fishermen+should+not+Enter+the+Sea+because+of+Dangerous+Mines+in+the+Water).

**The scramble comes after Russia’s intelligence service**, the FSB, [claimed](http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm%21id%3D10439461%40fsbMessage.html) on March 19 that poor weather **had caused more than 400 naval mines to become disconnected** from the cables that were anchoring them, and warned that the mines were “drifting freely in the western part of the Black Sea,” which includes the territorial waters of Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Ukraine at the time dismissed the assertion as untrue and politically motivated. “This is complete disinformation from the Russian side,” Viktor Vyshnov, deputy head of Ukraine’s Maritime Administration, [told Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/world/mines-ukraine-drift-into-black-sea-russia-shipping-sources-say-2022-03-21/). “This was done to justify the closure of these districts of the Black Sea under so-called ‘danger of mines.’ ” The Washington Post was not able to independently verify either side’s claim.

A 1907 [international treaty](https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague08.asp) prohibits countries from laying [unanchored mines](https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/215-250002?OpenDocument) designed to damage ships unless they can be controlled or are “constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them ceases to control them.”

**The**[**Romanian Defense Ministry**](https://www.mapn.ro/cpresa/17361_mina-marina,-observata-in-largul-marii-negre,-la-70-de-kilometri-travers-de-capu-midia)**said Monday that a fishing vessel had spotted a drifting mine** about 8 a.m. and alerted maritime authorities, which then undertook an operation to neutralize it about 39 nautical miles from the Port of Midia, in southeast Romania. The ministry did not say where the mine came from and an update on the operation was not immediately available.

Meanwhile, **Turkey**[**said**](https://twitter.com/tcsavunma/status/1508341676640776193?s=20&t=y7Ix2flzoa7FytGg4IjrEQ)**Monday that it had**[**neutralized a mine**](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/26/russia-ukraine-war-news-putin-live-updates/#link-IX52NM2WY5BHTLZ62OUEUDA5F4?itid=lk_inline_manual_16)**detected off the coast of Igneada**, a town in the country’s northwest near the border with Bulgaria, while on Saturday another mine, which was thought to have drifted from the Black Sea, forced a temporary closure of the Bosporus, the key waterway that runs through Istanbul.

**The incident raised fears that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine could threaten traffic in the Bosporus**, [a choke point for global energy supplies and commerce](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/01/09/bosporus-strait-canal-istanbul-erdogan/?itid=lk_inline_manual_93&itid=lk_inline_manual_17).

Photographs purporting to show the mine depicted what appeared to be a metallic orb with spikes. On Saturday, Turkey’s defense minister, Hulusi Akar, described the mine as “old” and said Turkey had been in touch with the Kremlin and with Kyiv about its appearance in the Bosporus.

**Deal in the squo solves food crisis without demining**

Sarah Anne **Aarup** **and** [Gabriela **Galindo 22**,](https://www.politico.eu/author/gabriela-galindo/) journalists for Politico, 6/29/22,” Turkey holds key to unblocking Black Sea grain deal, Ukraine says,” Politico, https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-holds-key-to-unblocking-black-sea-grain-deal-ukraine-says/

**Ukraine is looking to Turkey for security guarantees that would unlock a deal with Russia to allow millions of tons of grain to be shipped** through the Black Sea to a hungry world.

A government official in **Kyiv told POLITICO a plan is under discussion that would open up blocked Ukrainian ports for ships loaded with grain**. A security guarantee provided by Turkey or another state — likely one within NATO — is now the crucial missing piece of a deal, and if all sides can agree, a plan could be finalized within days, the official said.

The official cautioned that it is "premature to be too optimistic" about the prospects of an agreement, given how sensitive and difficult the talks are. But the outline of a potential deal, as seen by Kyiv, comes amid positive noises from the leaders of Turkey and Italy in recent days.

The stakes are high as the world faces a struggle to cope without wheat and other agri-food exports from the super-productive farms of Ukraine. Russia’s blockading of over 20 million tons of grain in Ukraine threatens to turn an international food crisis into a hunger emergency for countries in North Africa and the Middle East that are most reliant on Ukrainian supplies.

Before Russia's invasion, 90 percent of Ukraine's exports went through Black Sea ports such as Odesa and Mariupol. But the war has destroyed Mariupol and forced Ukrainian authorities to lay defensive mines around Odesa in preparation for a feared Russian attack.

The United Nations [is pushing](https://www.politico.eu/?p=2127211) to open a protected shipping lane in the Black Sea to allow the country to export significant volumes again. But officials in Kyiv, [as well as Western governments](https://www.politico.eu/?p=2122298), are suspicious that Russia will take advantage of opening the Odesa port to launch an attack.

On Tuesday, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi hinted that a breakthrough could be close. He said a potential deal **could be done which would not require Ukraine to remove the mines**, and that an agreement was mainly contingent on "a final yes from the Kremlin." He [cited](https://www.politico.eu/?p=2149037) information from U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres, who briefed G7 leaders at a summit earlier this week.

On Wednesday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan voiced his optimism over the prospects for an agreement, during talks with U.S. President Joe Biden at the NATO summit in Madrid.

"We are trying to solve the process with a balancing policy," Erdoğan said, according to [the Associated Press](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-nato-politics-finland-05bee518928c878dc3c170ff3044fa93). "Our hope is that this balance policy will lead to results and allow the possibility to get grain to countries that are facing shortages right now through a corridor as soon as possible.”

The Ukrainian official suggested Turkey itself could provide the necessary security guarantees to Ukrainian grain shipments. Previously Kyiv has suggested the U.N. could play a role in guaranteeing the safe passage of commercial shipping in the Black Sea. That idea seems to have receded.

“U.N. is just brokering the deal,” the Ukrainian official said. Now Kyiv is “looking for [a] national-level security guarantee — from Turkey or [another] state.” The official added that most of the countries that could play such a role “are NATO states.”

Explaining the contours of a potential agreement, the official said: “The idea is to use the itinerary that will not require any changes in military presence together with coordination via Turkey.” The Ukrainian official confirmed this meant using the routes that don't need de-mining.

Although Draghi told reporters that the talks between Russia, Ukraine and Turkey were speeding up, the Ukrainian official said that a deal could be reached “today, or never … everything depend on politics.” Then again, if the parties reach an “understanding,” an agreement could be completed “within days,” the official added.

On Sunday, the Turkish president’s spokesperson İbrahim Kalın [said](https://www.haberturk.com/cumhurbaskanligi-sozcusu-ibrahim-kalin-dan-haberturk-tv-ye-aciklamalar-3472768) it could take three to four weeks for a deal to be struck and for ships to start sailing via the safe passage.

Turkey, which has been trying to coordinate negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, [sent a military delegation](https://www.reuters.com/world/turkish-team-discuss-black-sea-grain-corridor-russia-this-week-media-2022-06-21/#main-content) to Moscow last week to negotiate a safe Black Sea passage. Kalın said that “if both sides agree, we will hold a Turkey-Ukraine-Russia-U.N. meeting in Istanbul.” He added that Ankara hopes to hold the meeting “as soon as possible.”

**Food crisis isn’t inherent**

**Fraser et al 22**, Fraser reported from Ankara, Turkey. Edith Lederer at the United Nations, Erika Kinetz in Kyiv, Ukraine, Raf Casert in Brussels, Jill Lawless in London and Geir Moulson in Berlin contributed; PBS associated press, 7/22/22, “Ukraine, Russia sign U.N. deal to export grain on Black Sea,” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/ukraine-russia-sign-u-n-deal-to-export-grain-on-black-sea

**Russia and Ukraine signed separate agreements Friday with Turkey and the United Nations clearing the way for the export of millions of tons of desperately needed Ukrainian grain** — as well as some Russian grain and fertilizer — across the Black Sea. The long-sought deal ends [a wartime standoff](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-obituaries-de6d667a3661f22dba26aa1f6e162718) that has threatened food security around the globe.

The U.N. plan will enable Ukraine — one of the world’s key breadbaskets — to export 22 million tons of grain and other agricultural goods that have been stuck in Black Sea ports [due to Russia’s invasion](https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-strikes-black-sea-kharkiv-3e10f17c3e0015abaf2f6d1f0e443bdd). U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres called it “a beacon of hope” for millions of hungry people who have faced huge increases in the price of food.